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The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize
a Right to Welfare: A Study in the Uses
and Limits of the Judicial Process
Samuel Krislov*
I. INTRODUCTION
Keynes once suggested that economic theories often play a
decisive role in human affairs even though those theories have
been discredited by theorists.' Decision makers learn such
theories before they have been scrutinized and rejected by theor-
ists and thus shape the course of future events with decisions
which are based upon dated and erroneous assumptions. Simi-
larly, one's view of what can be accomplished in the future may
be distorted when it springs from a diagnosis of past events which
has not yet been reshaped or refined by critical study This dis-
tortion is particularly marked where a reconstruction of the past
is buttressed by the results of empirical study and/or is draped
in abstruse sociological terms. Philosophers, sociologists and his-
torians busily retell the past where all too often the need is to re-
cast the past in order to liberate our perception of what is possi-
ble in the future.
Perhaps no federal program has been more draped in ab-
struse sociology than has the "war on poverty," and perhaps
no federal program has been less effectively buttressed by empir-
ical study A sense of total failure runs through the standard
evaluations of the "war"; the critics of the program are legion,
and the teeming poor are still with us. The consensual verdict
on the Johnson Administration's effort to attack poverty is that
the overall strategy was nonexistent, the necessary social in-
formation was lacking and the theories of social change were so
primitive and naive as to approach the absurd. Moreover, the
OEO founders and operators perennially oversold the poverty
program and thereby frustrated the setting of reasonable goals
* Professor of Political Science and Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota. B.A. 1951, M.A. 1952, New York Umversity;
Ph.D. 1955, Princeton University.
1. J. KEYNEs, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, hr= AND
MoNEY 383 (1939).
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and aggravated the disillusionment when the goals were not
met.2 These criticisms extend to virtually the entire range of
the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) programs, and those
programs which have withstood the test of time are only slightly
less disparaged and in danger of abandonment than those which
have not.
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to assess the criti-
cisms of all OEO programs; perhaps it is enough to note that at
least on the surface the criticism is warranted. Among the
weaknesses common to all the basic OEO poverty programs was
that every program featured a vague mystique of local diversity
and creativity which was largely a cover for the lack of a coherent
national program. Each program was premised upon an inter-
connection among all aspects of poverty, the assertion of which
constantly shifted attention and effort from one social concern to
another before the efficacy of any one effort could be measured,
far less achieved.3 Every program, implicitly rejecting the ex-
isting power structure, embarked upon a redefinition of societal
authority and responsibility 4 with only the vaguest of substitutes
in mind. The lack of data, direction and philosophy reinforced
one another to frustrate each program's progress.
The purpose of this Article is threefold: (1) to tell the little
known story of the poverty lawyers' efforts to constitutionalize
a right to welfare by altering the traditional notions of equal
protection; (2) to inquire into the nature of social change and
particularly the degree to which a society can bring about such
change through the work of its own paid agents; and (3) to sug-
gest some characteristics and boundaries of the legal process as
presently conceived.
2. See, e.g., Miller & Roby, The War on Poverty Reconsidered, in
POVERTY VIEWS FROM THE LEFT 69-70 (J. Lamer & I. Howe eds. 1965).
3. "So fractured is the original OEO program that one recent eval-
uation (Ferman, 1969) examined the impact of the program upon nearly
everything except poverty." Jones, Federal Efforts to Solve Contempo-
rary Social Problems, in E. SMIGEL, HANDBOOK ON THE STUDY OF SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 555 (1971). In one sense this was natural; as Ginsberg and
Shiffman point out, the poverty program was originally an effort to
reconceptualize a whole series of social failures mostly, though not ex-
clusively, tangent to race: delinquency, crime, illegitimacy, school drop-
outs, unemployment and slums. Ginsberg & Shiffman, Manpower and
Training Problems in Combating Poverty, 31 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 159 (1966).
4. The effort to attack poverty valued both the end product of
reform and the psycho-individualistic processes by which reform was to
be sought.
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II. THE THEORETICAL CONFLICT AND AMBIGUITY
IN THE WAR ON POVERTY
A. THE OVERALL OEO PROGRAM
The concept of the "war on poverty" was based on an unsure
theoretical footing which made difficult both the formulation
of goals and the selection of programs. The overall poverty pro-
gram drew its inspiration from the twin strands of the civil
rights movement: the moral-ethical analysis of problem areas
and the quasi-existentialist emphasis on action and personality
transformation through effective individual action. However,
few problem areas were more than cursorily analyzed, and the
objective of self-worth enhancement was continually frustrated
by a basic conflict between the theories of centralism and lo-
calism.
1. The Tension Between Centralism and Localism
In short, the welfare provisions of American society that now
help the upper two-thirds must be extended to the poor. This
can be done if the [poor] are motivated to take advantage of
the opportunities before them, if they are invited into the soci-
ety. It can be done if there is a comprehensive program that
attacks the culture of poverty at every one of its strong points.
But who will carry out this campaign?
There is only one institution in the society capable of act-
ing to abolish poverty. That is the Federal Government"
Thus Michael Harrington, while recognizing that centralism too
often results in a massive, insensitive bureaucracy and that big
money is not a cure-all for the psychology of poverty, recognized
also that only the federal government had the political and
economic power to wage a "war on poverty." The fact that Har-
rington even considered an attack on poverty established him
with John Kenneth Galbraith as protagonists in the overall
OEO program. Although skeptical about the popular support
for any anti-poverty program,6 Galbraith too called for greater
centralization of the planning of both production and distribu-
5. M. HAPauNGTON, THE OTHER AmucA: PoVERTY IN THE UmTEn
STATEs 170 (1962).
6. [F]ew things are more evident in modern social history
than the decline of interest in inequality as an economic issue.
This has been particularly true in the United States. And it
would appear, among western countries, to be the least true of
the United Kingdom. While it continues to have a large ritual-
istic role in the conventional wisdom of conservatives and lib-
erals, inequality has ceased to preoccupy men's minds.
J.K. GALBRArn, THE AFFuENT SocnT 82 (1958).
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tion. Both Harrington and Galbraith reasoned that to reject
centralized financing, planning and control was to defeat any
realistic hope of mobilizing the forces needed to strike at the
roots of poverty.
In conflict with these exhortations of centralism, the OEO pro-
grams often developed as forms of localized self-help and behav-
ior modification. Perhaps the key figure in this development
was Saul Alinsky, whose community organizing followed the
pattern of community control and localism suggested by the
works of many influential writers of the period.7 The "local-
ism" theorists saw Washington only as a source of funds and the
promulgation of national standards; the actual implementation
of an effective poverty program had to be the work of the locality
involved." Alinsky's writings were indicative of the poverty
program's theoretical clash. While emphasizing the failings of
centralism and the virtues of volunteerism, Alinsky offered less
a positive blueprint for action than a finding of fault with exist-
ing programs and trends. Thus, founded upon theories which
were broad, ill-defined and oftentimes antithetic, the overall
OEO program began on a note less hopeful than was perceived
by its actors.
2. Consequences of the Tension and Ambiguity
The tenet that the poor primarily needed self-actualization
was a godsend to the OEO designers. The tenet's language of
"maximum feasible participation" and "community creativity"
served both as a definition of goals and as a basis of choice among
specific programs. In choosing the flexibility of ambiguity, the
program framers were perhaps realistically reflecting our lack of
knowledge of either the problem of poverty or its cure. The
choice, however, avoided rather than resolved the problem. As
a result, too often the overall OEO program resembled Stephen
Leacock's hero who "flung himself from the room, flung him-
self on his horse and rode madly off in all directions." This tur-
7. See generally S. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS (1971); S. ALIN-
SKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (1946, 1969); H. GANS, PEOPLE AND PLANS
(1968); P. GOODMAN, NEW REFORMATION: NOTES OF A NEOLITHIC CON-
SERVATIVE (1970); P. GOODMAN, LIKE A CONQUERED PROVINCE: Tii.
MORAL AMBIGUiTY OF AMERICA (1967); Education Vouchers, 163 NEW
REPUBLIC 19 (1970). Cf. Godwin, Sources of the Public Unhappiness,
THE NEW YoRKER, Jan. 4, 1969, at 38.
8. See E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY (1970); M. FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
9. S. LEACOCK, NONSENSE NOVELS 73 (1922).
[Vol. 58:211
RIGHT TO WELFARE
moil was compounded by the abandonment of the follow-ups
which had been planned to evaluate the validity and practicality
of the various underlying theories. Budgetary and program-
matic cutbacks starved the very research into and definition of
the problem of poverty which were vital to any effective attack
upon it.
B. THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
The legal services branch of the OEO suffered much the same
pattern of development as did the overall poverty program.
Numerous congressional committees and presidential commis-
sions skirted the issue of legal aid for the poor, the original OEO
legislation failed to mention legal services, and the renewal legis-
lation merely assumed its existence.' 0 Nonetheless, the legal
services program did develop as one of the most effective OEO
programs, and its impetus flowed from many sources. In his
criticisms of the legal profession, Ralph Nader suggested that a
reassessment of the relationship of the law and the poor was
long overdue. A dissatisfaction with this relationship also ap-
peared in such diverse quarters as the Vera Institute" and the
Supreme Court, which subsequent to Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation'2 had made an extension of the equal protection clause
that led Justice Fortas to comment, "we are witnessing the grad-
ual reduction of the category of constitutional non-persons." 13
The Court's criminal law decision requiring counsel for indi-
gents14 not only reflected this dissatisfaction but also directed
legislative reevaluation of and response to the legal plight of the
poor. Thus, in reaction to these forces, the legal program
emerged as much as it was created.
1. The Theoretical Influence of the Mobilization for Youth
The Mobilization for Youth (MFY) had considerable in-
10. Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. CHL L. REv.
699 (1969).
11. The Vera Institute of Justice has achieved considerable re-
nown for its work on the criminal justice system in connection with the
protection of the indigent. Started in 1961 as a one-man philanthropic
venture, the Institute has made significant innovations, especially in bail
procedures.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The expansion of the equal protection
clause perhaps has been best chronicled in A. Cox, THE WA~im CouRr:
CoNsnTunoxAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT oF REoR. (1968).
13. Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 401, 404
(1967).
14. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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fluence in the formulation of the legal services program as well
as that of the overall OEO program. Largely funded by the
Ford Foundation in one of its more daring phases, the MFY oper-
ated in the Lower East Side with wide ranging community par-
ticipation and with considerable panache. The original com-
munity action proposal for the MFY had no legal program, but
in 1963 the Vera Foundation was asked to devise a community
legal aid service. The apparent success of the resulting MFY
legal program encouraged the OEO principals to develop a legal
services counterpart in the OEO.
In looking to the operation of the MFY's legal program, the
OEO legal services directors borrowed also from the Mobiliza-
tion's theoretical bent. Prominent in the theory of the legal
program were Edward Sparer 15 of the Center on Social Welfare
Policy and Law at Columbia University, and Edgar and Jean
Camper Cahn.16 Under their influence the MFY purported to
base its efforts on sociological theory, the so-called "opportunity
theory" of Cloward and Ohlin.17 If nothing else, the emphasis
on the provision of individual opportunity permitted the MFY's
15. Sparer's memo, "Poverty, Law and Social Welfare," appar-
ently became the policy of MFY. See JusTicE AND THE LAW-IN THE
MOBILIZATION FOR YOUTH EXPERIENCE 37 (H. Weissman ed. 1969). On
the Center itself see Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office-OEO's Spe-
cial Grants in Legal Services, 56 GEO. L.J. 742, 756-60 (1969).
16. As early as 1964 their discussion focused attention on the poten-
tial of legal services as a participatory experience for the client. See
generally Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective,
73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964). Over the years, the Cahns have been both
active participants-at first in OEO and later in more activist legal
services groups-and theorists. Their discussions emphasize the need
for new social structures and new sets of loyalties. However, they have
explicitly recognized that their hypostatized state of affairs would cre-
ate new problems for professional relationships and group loyalties.
They have also warned that lawyer definition of social need is a serious
undertaking and that control by the client should be the order of the
day. See generally Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profes-
sion?-The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005
(1970).
But to recognize difficulties, however in extenso, is not to meet them.
The Cahns exhort lawyers to be responsive in ways not easy, perhaps
even impossible, for professionals. Moreover, the Cahns' new sub-
group identities are not as easily created as discussed. From Mary
Parker Follett to Granville Hicks to the Cahns themselves, the re-
creation of a sense of intimate community has been a literator's dream
rather than a reality. The Cahns' continuous monitoring of the legal
services program and their ability to borrow theoretic insight from any
field gave a sense of intellectual excitement to the venture. But it af-
forded little of the stable unfolding of answers and the systematic ex-
amination of alternatives which the legal services program needed.
17. R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY (1960).
(Vol. 58:211
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leaders to write elegant proposals which promised, inter alia,
hypothesis testing and theory refinement. Although the "oppor-
tunity theory" was unusually vague, even for social science
theories, and the critical evidence for its confirmation was hardly
science, it was nonetheless ahead of most efforts in the field.
2. The MFY's Theory in Action
The MFY's glamour and apparent success pushed the OEO
in the direction of Community Action Programs in the legal serv-
ices area. It has been suggested that this OEO activity appealed
to the Democrtic administration because it created a new politi-
cal mechanism within the core of the city, an area where old
political machines had decayed and where minorities had become
increasingly unreachable and difficult to mobilize.' 8 Political
suspicion was minimized because the mechanism came garbed in
scholarly terms, had originally been set in motion by the Ford
Foundation and could attract collaboration by prestigious pol-
icy scientists and professionals. The OEO legal program could,
in Moynihan's words, "pass the Congress, help win the Presiden-
tial election, and eliminate poverty, in perhaps that order."' 9
However, even though the legal program was politically salable,
it was plagued by the same lack of theoretical precision and
direction which undermined the overall OEO anti-poverty effort.
Just as the conflict and ambiguity of overall OEO theory avoided
the problems of goal definition and program choice, so the vague-
ness of the legal program's theory impeded the systematic exam-
ination of alternatives and the stable unfolding of answers that
the program needed. Moreover, the emphasis on constant action
aggravated the lack of examination and analysis: "It is almost
impossible to write in this area, because we are so busy litigating
that no time is left."20
I. THE DISPUTE OVER LEGAL STRATEGY
The effectiveness of the OEO legal program was from its
inception frustrated not only by the ambiguity of its theory but
also by a dispute over what legal strategy should be employed.
18. See, e.g., Piven, Federal Intervention in the Cities: The New
Urban Programs as a Political Strategy, in E. SMIGEL, HANDBOOK OF THE
STUDY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 591 (1971).
19. Moynihan, What is "Community Action?", 5 THE Pumac IN-
TEREST 6 (1966).
20. Gaines, Lawyers and Welfare Rights, in NATIONAL AssocrATIoN
OF SociAL WORKERS, THE Counrs AND SocwL CHANGE AGENTS 3 (E. Witte
ed. 1969).
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A conflict existed between those who wanted to provide the
legal services requested by the individual, in the older tradition
of legal aid, and those who wanted to generate the "test cases"
required to attack broad institutional practices. The question
of strategy was important in shaping the structure of the OEO
legal program and in deciding what direction that program would
take.
A. THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL Am APPROACH
The defenders of the traditional legal aid approach empha-
sized that the legal needs of the poor, although "routine," stem-
med from conditions often vital to the prosperity and the self-
esteem of the individual. The legal aid advocates saw their ap-
proach as one of great social importance rather than as "band-
aid" litigation or personal palliative. To litigate divorces,
tenant complaints and other "routine" cases was to meet the
threat to the fiscal and psychological well-being of those at or
near the poverty level.2 1
However, a basic criticism of the traditional legal aid ap-
proach was that the attempt to react to every individual's legal
needs generated a staggering case load. Gresham Sykes' study
in Denver indicated that the poor have many legal needs which
are either suppressed or overlooked both because of more press-
ing daily concerns and because of a lack of access to legal ma-
chinery.22 The demand for legal services is elastic and self-prolif-
erating, and the publicized availability of free legal service for
the poor could be expected to generate an overwhelming de-
mand.23 More trenchant than the criticism that the mere pres-
ence of attorneys creates demand 24 was that which said the legal
21. One lawyer commented:
[I] would like to dispel any impression that I believe it appro-
priate to ask for fair hearings only to embarrass caseworkers, to
jam up the machinery of state and local agencies, and to build
client morale. I will not deny a firm belief that assessment of
these factors as well as the impact of legal action on welfare
rights organizational activities, on publicity regarding welfare,
and on other governmental and non-governmental bodies is a
perfectly appropriate .... method of obtaining relief .... Fair
hearings are not requested, and litigation is not instituted, for
the purpose of obtaining decisions. These procedures are in-
stituted to obtain relief.
Redlich, The Art of Welfare Advocacy, 36 AIBANY L. REv. 57, 77 (1971).
22. Sykes, Legal Needs of the Poor in The City of Denver, 4 LAw
AND SocIETY REV. 255 (1969).
23. Silver, Imminent Failure of Legal Service for the Poor: Why
and How to Limit Caseloads, 46 J. URBAN LAW 217 (1968).
24. H. ZEisEL, H. KLAVEN JR. & B. BUCHnHOLz, DELAY IN THE COURT
ch. 20 (1959).
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aid approach resulted in mundane issues that would attract
overloaded and mediocre lawyers. In due course these lawyers
would be driven to bureaucratic, condescending attitudes
25
toward their clients and would thus perpetuate rather than rem-
edy the circle of poverty.
The shortcomings of the legal services programs as a way of
dealing with the problems of the poor have become increasingly
apparent over time. The ideal of service for all has led to ex-
tremely heavy caseloads, with a necessary effect on the quality
and comprehensiveness of the representation given .... In ad-
dition, legal services programs may fundamentally misconceive
the plight of the poor and the relation of the law to that plight.
A program focused upon services to individuals will fail to deal
with the legal and institutional sources of the grievances of the
poor.... In the legal services office, overwhelmed by indi-
vidual cases, reform of laws and institutions-reform that would
affect the poor as a group and would deal with the depressed
state of their day-to-day existence-is neglected in the rush
of small, individual matters the office must handle.28
B. THE TEST CASE APPROACH
Those who warned against the inherent limitations of the
legal aid approach and called for a bolder strategy saw the "test
case" as a more economical use of legal talent and resources.
Earl Johnson often cited a California case involving medical ser-
vices as an illustration of the utility of class action suits: the
amount there saved for welfare recipients was $210 million,
an amount greater than the total OEO legal services budget for
a year.27 Even more than a vehicle in which large amounts of
money were at stake, the test case was seen by its adherents as
a focus for organization. A single test case could replace a strike
or a revolution: 28
25. An oft quoted example of such a supercilious attitude is the
statement of a Legal Aid director in Pittsburgh that:
People may say that poverty prevents (the poor) from having
the same rights to get a divorce as a person with money, yet
we must remember obtaining a divorce is not a right but a
privilege. For most Legal Aid clients, a separation is just as
useful and practical as a divorce.
Carlin, Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor, 1 LAW AND
SocInE Rzv. 9, 59 n.178 (1967).
26. Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069,
1073-74 (1970).
27. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 208, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr.
689 (1967). See Johnson's comments in 2 LAw iN AcTiON, April, 1968,
at 2.
28. During the latter part of the 1960's an image of the "radical
lawyer" was being formulated as antithesis to the conventional business
mouthpiece. In the effort to transform the "system," there was an
unresolved conflict between: (1) the notion of the detached legalist
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[L] aw suits can consciously be brought for the public discussion
they generate, and for the express purpose of influencing middle
class and lower class perspectives on the problems they illumi-
nate. They can be vehicles for setting in motion other politi-
cal processes and for building coalitions and alliances. For ex-
ample, a suit against a public agency may be far more important
for the discovery of the agency's practices and records which it
affords than for the legal rule or court order it generates. An
effective political challenge to the agency may be impossible
without the type of detailed documentation that only systematic
discovery techniques can provide. It is on this base that coali-
tions and publicity can be built, and that groups can be or-
ganized to limit previously invisible authority.29
Although the test case approach arguably had the attributes
mentioned above, it nonetheless met criticism commensurate with
that of the legal aid position. Henry DiSuaro 0 impugned the
suggestion that the test case was an effective means of organiza-
tion. Lawsuits creak along without any relation to the dynamics
of a real movement and meet demoralizing defeats along the
way, even though they may be ultimately successful. More im-
portantly, it is a tactical mistake to organize around an issue the
determination of which rests with the enemy. Harold Roth-
wax 3l also recognized the frustrating delay in the courts and
made the more telling point that a judge whose office is "politi-
cal" would be quite reluctant to strike down the acts of elected
legislators.8 2 Moreover, both Rothwax and Gary Bellow agreed
who would survey the legal landscape and divine a strategy of test
cases; and (2) the image of the counsel-comrade who would go shoulder
to shoulder with all community members and abide by their mass de-
cisions in pursuit of this transformation. However appealing, both char-
acterizations of the role of the lawyer lack much substance. The de-
tached legalists were nothing more than the elitist lawyer's version of
Lenin's vanguard party; the counsel-comrade was really a romantic
denial of professionalism. Only the Cahns, supra note 16, noted the need
for some surrender of professional independence without indulging in
such whimsical characterizations.
29. Comment, supra note 26, at 1087.
30. DiSuaro, The Movement and the Legal System, in RADICAL
LAWYERs 67-68 (J. Black ed. 1971).
31. See Weissman, supra note 15, at 142-43.
32. The test case ran afoul of the related discovery that judges
were influenced by social consequences. Essentially what is involved is
Llewellyan's "Law of Leeways," the dictate that judges trade off legal
consciousness and the freedom accorded by legal materials against
social exigencies and social need. A "right" is to be seen as a conclu-
sion of a complex argument, not a platonic entity on the one hand nor
an empty ipse dixit on the other. Julius Stone has interpreted the con-
cept of a "right" stated in A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1959):
[A] right is a "systematic" concept, that is to be understood as
a symbol which represents the operation of certain rules in the
legal order, that is, in a body of rules logically interrelated
with each other. It is thus not an illusion, ut a tool of legal
[Vol. 58:211
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that a test case which successfully challenged a particular rule
that embodies an injustice would be meaningless without a politi-
cal base to support the court's decision. A rule change, "without
a political base to support it, just doesn't produce any substan-
tial result because rules are not self-executing: they require
an enforcement mechanism." 33  In support of this assertion,
Bellow cited regulation of the working conditions of field work-
ers in California, an elaborate scheme unenforced by a political
structure which had no interest in prosecuting offenders, and
concluded that "[i] t's nonsense to devote all available lawyer re-
sources to changing rules. ' 34 In short, Bellow saw the test case
as a unique and soon to-be-forgotten event rather than as the
culmination of a changing pattern of power and legal relation-
ships.
C. SEq ENTIAL TEST CASES
Given the welfare lawyers' devotion to the social impact of
a legal decision, their reaction to the broad social forces that
worked against their own efforts was hostile and even naive.
Their surprising reluctance to think in jurisprudentially prac-
tical terms was an invitation to disillusionment, and inevitably
it came.3 5 However, a strategy of using a sequence of test cases
reasoning, making argument less cumbrous and repetitive and
allowing more complex problems to be more efficiently hand-
led.
Stone, "Social Engineers" and "Rational Technologists", 13 STAN. I
REv. 670, 687-88 (1961) (emphasis in original).
33. Comment, supra note 26, at 1077.
34. Id. at 1078. Bellow led up to this conclusion by stating:
California has the best laws governing working conditions of
farm laborers in the United States. Under California law,
workers are guaranteed toilets in the fields, clear, cool drinking
water, covered with wire-mesh to keep flies away, regular rest
periods, and a number of other "protections." But when you
drive into the San Joaquin Valley, you'll find there are no
toilets in field after field, and that the drinking water is nei-
ther cool, nor clean, nor covered. If it's provided at all, the
containers will be rusty and decrepit. It doesn't matter that
there's a law on the books. There's absolutely no enforcement
mechanism. Enforcement decisions are dominated by a politi-
cal structure which has no interest in prosecuting, disciplining
or regulating the state's agricultural interests.
Id. at 1077-78.
35. So one lawyer lamented:
The D.C. District Court case ... asks that the Secretary of
HEW be enjoined from certifying payment of federal matching
funds for welfare programs in thirty states, and that he be or-
dered to recoup funds improperly paid to those states. By the
time the suit is finished, more than one billion dollars will be
involved. I personally devised an iron-clad legal argument
demonstrating that the money is being paid illegally and must
19731
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rather than one ultimate case directed at a broad "injustice"
avoided much of this disillusionment and met much of the criti-
cism by DiSuaro, Rothwax and Bellow.
1. Flooding the System
The sequential test case strategy may be designed to mount
a case-after-case attack upon a specific set of "rules" to reach a
broad legal objective. In its constrained and concentrated at-
tack on restrictive covenants, the NAACP's legal defense fund
drive against the "separate but equal" doctrine in the 1940's
was an example of such an approach. 30  The sequential test
case strategy may also utilize not only the attack upon specific
"rules" but also the follow-up of political field organization to
reach a broad political or social objective, for example, the
"white primary" cases and follow-up.37
In the welfare area, a further example of such an approach
was the attempt to overload the welfare rolls in the belief that
the resultant failure of the welfare system would bring about
an improvement.3 8 To bring about this improvement in the wel-
fare system, participants brought test cases to eliminate the legal
obstacles to welfare eligibility and payment: the "man-in-the-
house" and residency requirements.39 They then followed with
political organization and street agitation to put pressure on
welfare workers to enroll potential recipients. The participants
further sought publicity to encourage a broad spectrum of peo-
ple to seek welfare benefits and thereby escalate welfare costs.
That spectrum even included people who were ineligible or who
be taken back. In his motion to dismiss, the United States At-
torney completely misunderstands my legal argument. If my
opposition to his motion is good-and it is wonderful-then the
court will see that it has no choice but to grant the order. If
the District Judge fails to see it, the Circuit Judges surely will.
Yet one need not know anything about law or the issues in-
volved in this case to conclude that the United States govern-
ment will not be ordered to take one billion dollars from thirty
states. "But, we can win!" I wake up screaming in the night.
But realistically we can't; I have gotten so involved in the
game that I can no longer see the obvious truth: we will lose.
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1061 (1970)
(emphasis in original).
36. See C. VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959).
37. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
38. Piven and Cloward were among the "overload" proponents.
See Stern, Down and Out in New York, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1972
(Magazine), at 46, 54.
39. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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fraudulently received multiple benefits. As a result, a welfare
crisis of sorts did develop, and a consciousness of the welfare
problem did increase. However, any ultimate improvement in
the welfare system was lost in a political backlash, a govern-
mental overreaction to the results of the strategy. Thus, al-
though some still cling to the dogma that out of repression will
emerge ultimate relief,40 the test case "flooding-the-system"
strategy has been a patent failure in welfare reform.
2. Sparer's Strategy
The most significant and constructive welfare test case stra-
tegy was developed.largely by the Columbia University Center
on Social Welfare, Policy, and Law and was implemented by at
least one group of OEO consultant lawyers. The most promi-
nent and outspoken of these was Edward Sparer, who outlined
the strategy in a number of sources.4 1 Sparer's goal was to chal-
lenge one-by-one what he saw as the four major defects of the
American welfare system:
(1) the innumerable tests for aid and exclusions from aid, most
of which were unrelated to need; (2) procedures which reduced
the welfare recipient to a "client," stripped of constitutional
and other rights assumed by other citizens and forced into de-
pendency upon the welfare agency's whim; (3) the state and
local character of the welfare system, which, among other
things, is responsible for the numerous welfare "residence"
rules for the continuing major reliance on state and local fund-
ing; and (4) the inadequate and often shockingly low amount of
the money grant.4 2
A sequential test case assault on the criteria for granting
aid, the "procedural" status of the recipient and the "residence"
rules was really but a prelude to the assault on the inadequacy
of the aid itself. The heart of the Sparer strategy was not to aim
at procedural or classificatory inequality but to get at the jug-
ular-the amount and nature of welfare-through judicial means.
Sparer hoped that once the Supreme Court recognized the in-
adequacy of the welfare grant, it would read a "right to life"
into the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
that would guarantee an adequate minimum payment for every
needy individual in society. The welfare attorneys were vague
as to the mechanics of its ultimate establishment, but they cer-
40. See Stern, supra note 38.
41. See, e.g., Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12
U.C.LA. L. REv. 361 (1964).
42. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTs OF AznmucANs 65,
66 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
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tainly did not exclude a judicial as opposed to a legislative deter-
mination of what actual dollar figure would constitute an "ade-
quate" welfare grant minimum.
IV. THE OUTCOME OF THE SPARER STRATEGY
A. THE GENERAL SETTING
Sparer's grand strategy was quite compatible with the aims
of those who were "flooding the system," but that approach was
hardly at the core of the objectives of the "right to life" attor-
neys. More important than any strategical compatibility was
the fact that the various phases of Sparer's plan coincided with
developments in other areas of the law. The procedural and
categorical emphases of the welfare system were methods of
qualification whose time had come; as Justice Fortas suggested,
the category of "non-person" was being washed away from
American law.43 Similarly, the distinction between "rights"
and "privileges" was being rejected as a conclusionary label
rather than an analytic tool for decision-making. 4'1 From Wie-
man v. Updegraff45 through NAACP v. Alabama40 to Thorpe v.
Housing Authority of the City of Durham,47 the Supreme Court
was recognizing that impermissible conditions may be attached
by legislatures to an otherwise authorized grant of benefits.
In testing such conditions against the requirements of due pro-
cess, the Court established itself as the final arbiter and required
that they be supported by either a rational basis or a compell-
ing state need.
43. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
44. The erosion of the right-privilege distinction is perhaps best
illustrated in the area of government employment. Many years ago, in
McAuliffe v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517
(1892), Judge Holmes was able to write, "The petitioner [a policeman]
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman." However, that government employ-
ment is no longer merely a "privilege" and that due process now controls
its termination is illustrated by a long line of cases. See, e.g., Whitehill
v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
45. 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (statute requiring a loyalty oath by state
employees violates due process where there is no requirement that an
employee "know" about a proscribed organization of which he is a
member).
46. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (state "doing business" statute which re-
quires listing of all members of NAACP impedes freedom of association
and therefore is unconstitutional absent showing of compelling state in-
terest in requiring list).
47. 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (tenant of federally assisted housing proj-
ect entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard prior to eviction).
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Thus, the legal setting seemed ripe for an attack upon the
inequities of welfare law, but the success of the attack seemed
to lag behind the rapidity of change in other areas of the law.
As late as 1966, Judge Holtzoff could sweepingly declare that
[p]ayments of relief funds are grants and gratuities. Their
disbursement does not constitute payment of legal obligations
that the government owes. Being absolutely discretionary,
there is no judicial review of the manner in which that discre-
tion is exercised. 48
It was perhaps the lag in the development of new welfare law
which finally allowed the legal attack to rapidly and dramati-
cally catch up. Indeed, as suggested later in this Article,40 it is
likely that the very rapidity of change was self-defeating. Be-
cause the cases came upon one another's heels, they had less
total impact and ultimate consequence than a less hectic, more
gradual and hard won set of triumphs might have had.
B. SPARE'S FIRST THREE PHAsEs RAPIDLY ACCOMPLISHED
The welfare lawyers successfully challenged in rapid succes-
sion Sparer's initial three characteristics of the American wel-
fare system. In the space of less than half a decade the courts
struck down the "man in the house" regulation,"0 required rea-
sonable grounds for the geographic differences in payments 1
and held that the qualification of an individual whose eligibility
had been previously established could not be terminated with-
out a hearing.52 In Shapiro v. Thompson5 3 the Supreme Court
invalidated a one year residency requirement as a condition to
the receipt of welfare payments. These triumphs encouraged
both the welfare attorneys and the Court minority which was
apparently advocating a "right to life" doctrine.
1. Shapiro v. Thompson
Shapiro v. Thompson54 was a consolidation of three appeals
each of which was from the decision of a three-judge District
48. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 259 F. Supp. 423, 424 (D.D.C. 1966).
49. See Part VIII infra and text following notes 104, 109, and 119
infra.
50. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
51. E.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397
U.S. 397 (1970); Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
52. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In a related area, it
was held a violation of equal protection to exclude illegitimate chil-
dren from possible recovery for the wrongful death of a parent. Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
53. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
54. Id.
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Court holding unconstitutional a statutory denial of welfare pay-
ments to applicants who were not one-year residents of the juris-
diction. In affirming these decisions, the Supreme Court found
the statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a
year to constitute an invidious discrimination:
There is no dispute that the effect of the waiting-period require-
ment in each case is to create two classes of needy resident fam-
ilies indistinguishable from each other except that one is com-
posed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the
second of residents who have resided less than a year, in thejurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference the first class
is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon
which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very
means to subsist--food, shelter, and other necessities of life.5
The Court closely examined each of the asserted justifications
for the classification5" and concluded that none of them could
withstand the special scrutiny required where there has been
an infringement of a constitutionally protected right:
7
We conclude therefore that appellants in these cases do not use
and have no need to use the one-year requirement for the gov-
ernmental purposes suggested. Thus, even under traditional
equal protection tests a classification of welfare applicants ac-
cording to whether they have lived in the State for one year
would seem irrational and unconstitutional. But, of course, the
traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classi-
fication here touches on the fundamental right of interstate
movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter
standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.5 8
Although it was clear that the statutes in Shapiro were Lin-
constitutional because they abridged a "fundamental right," it
was not clear from the Court's opinion just which right formed
55. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
56. The governmental justifications for the classification were
that it:
(1) facilitate[d] the planning of the welfare budget; (2) pro-
vide[d] an objective test for residency; (3) minimize[d] the
opportunity for recipients fraudulently to receive payments
from more than one jurisdiction; and (4) encourage[d] early
entry of new residents into the labor force.
Id. at 634. The Court dismissed the first justification because there was
no factual showing that the waiting period was actually used to facili-
tate planning. The second and third justifications were rejected because
in the investigation of any welfare application there arose information
sufficient both to assure residency and to protect against fraud. The
fourth justification would logically require a similar waiting period for
long-term residents to encourage their early entry into the labor force.
57. The Court majority in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941), rested the right to travel upon the commerce clause, and Jus-
tices Douglas and Jackson based the decision upon the privileges and
immunities clause. See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966);
In re Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
58. 394 U.S. at 638 (emphasis in original).
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the basis of the decision. In his dissent, Justice Harlan im-
pugned the majority's expansion of the equal protection clause
reflected in its use of the compelling interest standard to review
the violation of a fundamental right, whether that right be the
right to travel or the right to life. He suggested that a violation
of the constitutional right to travel could be better dealt with
under the due process clause than the equal protection clause
and criticized "the Court's cryptic suggestion ante ... that the
'compelling interest' test is applicable merely because the result
of the classification may be to deny the appellees 'food, shelter
and other necessities of life'." 59 Nonetheless, although the basis
of the Shapiro decision was unclear, the "right to life" exponents
hailed the mere implication that welfare legislation classifica-
tions would thereafter be subject to the compelling interest
scrutiny of the Court.60
2. The Extension of Shapiro
The arguable expansion of the equal protection doctrine in
Shapiro seemed to foreshadow the complete success of the "right
to life" approach.61 The argument that a family maximum wel-
fare payment was unconstitutional seemed to be the final hur-
dle to the assertion of a personal constitutional right to adequate
welfare payments. It would be argued that the statutory pro-
hibition of benefits to additional children constituted an invid-
ious discrimination between the class of children who fell with-
in the family maximum and the class of those who did not. The
Court, it was hoped, would examine the asserted justifications
59. Id. at 661 (dissenting opinion).
60. Harlan's critical interpretation of the majority's opinion in
Shapiro seemed at the time to be more accurate than that of Justice
Stewart (concurring) and Justices Warren and Black (dissenting) who
read the opinion as requiring a compelling interest solely in terms of the
constitutional right to travel. Margaret Rosenheim wrote:
[U]nless the Court has silently given decisive weight in these
cases to the fact of destitution, the outcome is hard to under-
stand.
Rosenheim, Shapiro v. Thompson: The Beggers are Coming to Town,
1969 Suprmmm COURT REvmw 303, 332.
61. Charles Reich, recognizing the potential of the equal protection
doctrine, had some years before Shapiro suggested the possibility of
"vesting" welfare rights in the fashion of agricultural and commercial
governmental subsidies. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Wel-
fare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965). Joel
Handler has since shown that the vesting of the right to agricultural and
commercial subsidies is less certain than Reich had assumed. See
Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54
CAL. L. RSV. 479 (1966).
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for the classification, the protection of limited fiscal resources
or the promotion of efficiency in welfare administration, and
conclude that they did not stand up under the special scrutiny
dictated by the infringement of a "fundamental right." And
finally, the further argument would be made that under the
equal protection clause each child was entitled at birth to an
amount of money which would insure that the child had food,
shelter and the other necessities of life. Although the Court was
not expected to automatically accept this final argument, it was
recognized that such a final step was not possible without the
rejection of the family maximum on Federal Aid to Families
With Dependent Children (AFDC) payments.
C. THE COLLAPSE OF SPARER'S STRATEGY: DANDRIDGE V. WILLIAMS
It was the very issue of a family maximum, the bridge to a
constitutional right to welfare, that arose in the case of Dan-
dridge v. Williams. 2 The outcome of the case, however, came as
a cruel and unexpected blow to the "right to life" hopefuls. Not
only did the Court refuse to strike down Maryland's family
maximum as violative of equal protection, but it went out of its
way to quash the Shapiro dicta that welfare legislation was sub-
ject to the compelling interest scrutiny of the Court. 3 Per-
haps Sparer best described the collapse of his own strategy:
[A] contrary result in Dandridge would have permitted whole-
sale challenges to the barriers created by state legislatures and
Congress to deny welfare assistance to groups of needy people,
Distinctions between grant levels of individuals in equal need,
whether because of differences in categories or their state of
residence, might have been brought down. Traditional divi-
sions between state and federal authority, and between the three
branches of government, would doubtless have been altered.
62. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
63. The Court unequivocally stated:
[Hlere we deal with state regulation in the social and economic
field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
and claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment only be-
cause the regulation results in some disparity in grants of
welfare payments to the largest AFDC families. [Cf. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, where, by contrast, the Court
found state interference with the constitutionally protected free-
dom of interstate travel.] . .. To be sure, the cases [requiring
only the "reasonable basis" test], and many others enunciating
this fundamental standard under the Equal Protection Clause,
have in the main involved state regulation of business or in-
dustry. The administration of public welfare assistance, by
contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of impover-
ished human beings. We recognize the dramatically real fac-
tual difference between the cited cases and this one, but we can
find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.
Id. at 484, 485 n.16.
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The equal protection clause would have become the main ve-
hicle for establishing a constitutional guarantee of human life.
In these and other ways, affirmative judicial scrutiny to guar-
antee equal protection could have led to a different America.04
Although there is more than a bit of the "for want of a nail"
grandiosity in Sparer's claim to a "different America," it is clear
that Dandridge would have been the linchpin in his complex
legal strategy. The remainder of this Article will attempt to ex-
plain the failure of the effort to constitutionalize the right to
welfare and to suggest lessons for future programs.
V. THE "RIGHT TO LIFE" DOCTRINE
A. THE GENEs s OF THE DoCmIE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
In pursuit of Sparer's grand design, the OEO lawyers sought
to guarantee "cradle to grave" security for every citizen by es-
tablishing a constitutional mandate to eliminate poverty. They
sought to extend the coverage of the equal protection clause and
to imbed therein the substantive "right to life." The analytical
groundwork for the extension of the equal protection clause had
been provided in the work of Jacobus ten Broek and Joseph
Tussman,65 and the "right to life" doctrine itself had been the
inspiration of A- Delafield Smith.00
As had Chief Justice Hughes, 7 ten Broek and Tussman
urged that the Court should halt the retreat from its due pro-
cess excesses of the past and reassert its power to strike down
grossly particularistic legislation as that which had survived
judicial scrutiny in Goesart v. ClearyG8 and Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilots Commissioners.6 9 They detected the theoreti-
64. Sparer, supra note 42, at 82.
65. Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L.R v. 341 (1949).
66. A. SvH TM R GaT To L= (1955). Smith was at one time the
Counsel General of the Federal Security Agency. It appears (to the best
of this author's knowledge and research) that Smith's writing was not
cited in any of the briefs or articles of the welfare attorneys; but since
his logic and phraseology anticipated and were so similar to their writ-
ings, complete coincidence seems unlikely. Moreover, Smith was a fre-
quent speaker in social work circles, and his ideas became well known
and something of a common heritage among people working in the area.
67. See, e.g., Ribble, The Constitutional Doctrines of Chief Justice
Hughes, 41 CoLmVi. L. Rnv. 1190, 1193 (1941).
68. 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (no denial of equal protection where a
Michigan statute, denying bartender's licenses to females, except for
"the wife or daughter of the male owner," in effect discriminates
against women owners of bars).
69. 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (apprenticeship program of river pilots
based on consanguinity not a violation of equal protection).
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cal vehicle for this reassertion in the Court's seeming shift away
from due process to substantive equal protection as the guardian
of substantive rights:
Due process is, after all, a weapon blunted and scarred in the
defense of property. The present Court, conscious of its destiny
as the special guardian of human or civil rights may well wish
to develop some alternative to due process as a sanctuary for
these rights.
• .. It should be noted, of course, that shifting a right from
the protection of due process to the protection of the equal pro-
tection clause neither clarifies or simplifies the problem of the
"absolute" character of a right nor eases the problem of deter-
mining what particular rights are to be regarded as enjoying
this absolute protection.
The transference of substantive rights to the equal protec-
tion clause by shifting the emphasis from equality to protec-
tion has implications for the Federal System. It undermines the
doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids only state ac-
tion. If the clause guarantees substantive rights, then it re-
quires their protection by the state. The failure of the state to
supply that protection is accordingly a violation of the clause.70
As ten Broek and Tussman noted, the Court's shift to the
equal protection clause as the guardian of fundamental rights
did not answer the question of what rights would be deemed
"fundamental." It was the inspiration of Smith, and the ulti-
mate task of the OEO lawyers, that the "right to life" be recog-
nized by the Court as one of the "fundamental" rights guaran-
teed by the equal protection clause and therefore entitled to pro-
tection by the state. Smith's doctrinal contribution of the
"right to life" was that of entitlement, that every individual in
the society is entitled as of right to receive the minimum needs
of life from that society. To buttress his assertion of entitle-
ment, Smith argued that the receipt of a welfare payment as a
gratuity rather than as a right degraded the recipient and was
therefore self-defeating.7 1 Social Security legislation had estab-
70. Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 65, at 364-65 (emphasis
added).
71. Thus Smith wrote:
As for psychology, you would do better, it seems to me, to rely
on the prestige that accompanies any well implemented legal
right than to keep harping on the idea that earned rights are
better than other rights .... For as you expand the social se-
curity system-I mean the so-called old-age and survivors in-
surance system as distinguished from public assistance-empha-
sizing with each expanded step that the individual is "earn-
ing" any benefits he receives, you are at the same time sub-jecting those without earning power to a more and more
poignant self-condemnation as social parasites. The psychology
thus induced will ultimately prove disastrous to society's at-
tempts to rehabilitate the individual and reconstruct inter-
personal relationships.
A. SM , supra note 66, at 59-60.
[Vol. 58:211
RIGHT TO WELFARE
lished some semblance of a legally enforceable entitlement in the
requirement of a fair hearing prior to the entitlement's discon-
tinuation, and the Court thus accepted the due process clause as
applicable to benefit controversies."2 However, the legislation
had stopped short of an outright declaration of a legal right to
benefits; there was no language which required the application
of the equal protection clause. Smith attributed this lack of fun-
damental right language to a legislative belief that basic con-
stitutional principles were applicable to all such statutory entit-
lements.73
B. THE REPuDATmoN OF THE DocTmq IN DANimoPE
As noted above7 4 Dandridge was crucial to the poverty law-
yers' attempt to establish the "right to life" as a "fundamental"
right guaranteed by the equal protection clause; it was par ex-
cellence Fuller's conception of a "bridging case."75
1. Lower Court Support for the OEO Lawyers' Position
As Dandridge moved toward decision many things seemed to
favor the OEO attorneys' position. A series of federal district
court decisions had consistently held various family maxima to
be invalid either as violative of equal protection or as contrary
to the purposes and provisions of the Social Security Act.1 0 In
addition, the Iowa supreme court had relied on its state version
of the equal protection clause to invalidate a family maximum
which the legislature had attempted to superimpose upon an
existing welfare program. The Iowa court found that the family
maximum amendment was an economy measure which was ex-
trinsic to the basic welfare-provision purpose of the legislation.77
However, whether the same logic could be applied to state ac-
tion in implementing a federal grant-in-aid program was at least
72. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
73. Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV. 1,
REv. 266, 268 (1949).
74. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text-
75. See Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PEN. L. REV. 429,
441 (1934).
76. Lindsey v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Kaiser
v. Montgomery, 319 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Cal- 1969); Westberry v. Fisher,
297 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Me. 1969); Dews v. Henry, 297 F. Supp. 587 (D.
Ariz. 1969). See also Metcalf v. Swank, 293 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Ill.
1968) (dictum).
77. Collins v. State Board of Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81 N.W.2d 4
(1957).
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problematic, and the United States Supreme Court ultimately
showed no interest in the Iowa precedent.
2. The Three-Judge District Court Decision in Dandridge
In the district court the Dandridge welfare recipients argued
that Maryland's family maximum discriminated against them in
violation of the equal protection clause merely because of the
size of their families. They further argued that the maximum
was incompatible with the purpose of the Social Security Act
of 1935 and contrary to the Act's explicit provisions. In its origi-
nal opinion78 the district court struck down the family maxi-
mum on both the constitutional and the statutory grounds urged
by the recipients. In support of its conclusion that Congress in-
tended the individual child rather than the family unit to be the
beneficiary of welfare aid, the court relied primarily upon a
1950 amendment of the Act which provided:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children
must .. . [provide] .. .that all individuals wishing to make
application for aid to families with dependent children shall
have opportunity to do so, and that aid to families with de-
pendent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness
to all eligible individuals.79
The court looked to both the legislative purpose of appropria-
tions under the Federal Aid to Families With Dependent Chil-
dren program8 0 and the definition of "dependent child" con-
tained in the Act 8 l to determine that the 1950 amendment man-
dated that aid be furnished to all dependent children.8 2
In its articulate analysis of both the purpose and provisions
of the Act, the court almost obscured the alternative basis for
its decision. The purpose of the AFDC program was to provide
support for dependent children, and the effect of the Maryland
family maximum was to create a classification which denied that
support to some of the intended recipients. Because the state
had advanced no rational basis for drawing the classification,
the court concluded "that the maximum grant regulation trans-
gresse[d] the equal protection clause. '8 3 Although the consti-
78. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968). Upon
motion by the Maryland Board of Welfare, the court issued a supple-
mental opinion. Id. at 459.
79. Social Security Act § 402(a) (10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (1970)
(emphasis added).
80. Social Security Act § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
81. Social Security Act § 406(a), 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
82. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 455 (D. Md. 1968).
83. Id. at 459.
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tutional basis for the original opinion seemed unimportant rela-
tive to the statutory basis, the court ultimately founded its de-
cision solely upon the equal protection clause.
Upon motion by the Maryland Board of Welfare, the court
reopened consideration of the issues involved in its original opin-
ion. It was brought to the attention of the court that Congress
had arguably granted its approval to family maxima by provid-
ing that a state AFDC plan must:
provide by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to de-
termine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to re-
flect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were es-
tablished, and any maximums that the State imposes on the
amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately
adjusted.84
This 1967 amendment to the Social Security Act had become an
issue in another welfare case, Rosado v. Wyman, 5 and thus could
not easily have avoided attention. Although the district court in
Dandridge expressed doubt that Congress had intended by this
amendment to endorse every welfare maximum,86 it felt con-
strained to retreat from any reliance on the statutory basis for
its original decision. As a result, the court restated its opinion,
basing it on the constitutional ground of equal protection and
thereby more clearly focused the constitutional issue for deter-
mination by the Supreme Court.
3. The Supreme Court Decision in Dandridge
In upholding the validity of the Maryland family maximum,
the Supreme Court rejected both the district court's interpreta-
tions of the Social Security Act and its analysis of equal pro-
tection guarantees. The Court declared that the necessary start-
ing point of such statutory construction was a recognition of the
state's great latitude in dispensing its available funds. As a re-
sult of this latitude, the state was not prohibited from balancing
the harm caused to all families by uniformly insufficient pay-
84. Social Security Act § 402(a) (23), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23) (1970)
(emphasis added).
85. 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
86. The court said:
[W]e find it difficult to say that § 213(b) represented a con-
sidered judgment by Congress that it wished to validate all
maximum grant regulations and that it wished to depart from
the basic objectives of prior Congresses, reaffirmed by it, that
benefits under AFDC be granted to all eligible individuals
and that to the maximum extent feasible for their interests de-
pendent children be kept in their own family units.
297 F. Supp. at 466 (emphasis in original).
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ments against the ability of large families to better weather di-
minished per capita payments. The statutory requirement that
aid "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals"' 7 meant only that every individual must receive
some aid, and such receipt was effected by Maryland's grants
to families. s8 Thus the Court in Dandridge rejected the district
court's conclusion that a specific grant must be made to every
individual according to that individual's standard of need. 80 In
closing its discussion of the statutory provisions, the Court de-
termined that by the Social Security Amendments of 196700 Con-
gress had fully recognized that the Act permits family maxima:
This specific congressional recognition of the state maximum
grant provisions is not, of course, an approval of any specific
maximum. The structure of specific maximums Congress left
to the States, and the validity of any such structure must meet
constitutional tests.91
As the Maryland grant system was not inimical to either
the purpose or the provisions of the Act, the validity of the
family maximum ultimately depended upon whether it satisfied
the requirements of the equal protection clause. In a few
laconic phrases, the Supreme Court put to rest any notion that
the receipt of welfare payments was a "fundamental" right which
could be abridged only in the "compelling" interests of the state.
0 2
87. Social Security Act § 402(a) (10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (1970).
See text accompanying note 79 supra.
88. The Court determined that this interpretation of the specific
provision comported with the purpose of the Act:
Nor does the maximum grant system necessitate the dissolution
of family bonds. For even if a parent should be inclined to
increase his per capita family income by sending a child away,
the federal law requires that the child, to be eligible for AFDC
payments, must live with one of several enumerated relatives.
The kinship tie may be attenuated but it cannot be destroyed.
397 U.S. at 480. In his dissent Justice Douglas made a lengthy examina-
tion of the Act's legislative history and rejected the majority's interpre-
tation of the provision in favor of that of the district court. Id. at 493-99
(dissenting opinion).
89. The Court said:
Although the appellees argue that the younger and more re-
cently arrived children in such families are totally deprived of
aid, a more realistic view is that the lot of the entire family is
diminished because of the presence of additional children with-
out any increase in payments .... It is no more accurate to
say that the last child's grant is wholly taken away than to
say that the grant of the first child is totally rescinded. In fact,
it is the family grant that is affected.
Id. at 477-78 (emphasis in original).
90. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821. See notes
84-86 supra and accompanying text.
91. 397 U.S. at 482.
92. See note 63 supra.
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The state had advanced several tenable justifications for its fam-
ily grant maximum 3 and therefore had met the constitutional
test imposed upon it by the equal protection clause:
If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not
offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results
in some inequality." ... "The problems of government are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific." . .. "A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
But the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State
must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or
not attacking the problem at all. ... It is enough that the
State's actim be -rationally based and free from invidious dis-
crimination. The regulation before us meets that test.o4
Thus, faced with a strange "right to life" doctrine that essen-
tially involved an overnight "greening of America," the Court
recoiled:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classi-
fications made by its laws are imperfect If the classification
has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitu-
tion. .... 95
With this epitaph the OEO strategy was buried.
VI. TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE
"RIGHT TO LIFE" FAILURE
Given the many advantages the OEO lawyers seemingly had,
their failure in Dandridge to constitutionalize the right to wel-
fare requires explanation. The ten Broek-Tussman critique of
substantive law, the emergence in the Court of a growing re-
liance upon the equal protection clause, the development of the
"right to life" doctrine, the activism of the Warren Court--all
had promised a quite different result in Dandridge.
93. Maryland argued that the regulation was justified because it
encouraged gainful employment, maintained an equitable balance in
economic status as between welfare and non-welfare families, provided
incentives for family planning and allocated available public funds in
such a way as to fully meet the needs of the largest number of families.
Perhaps recognizing the '"undamental" nature of the right involved, the
district court had rejected these justifications because the regulation it-
self was invalid on its face for overreaching. In his dissent Justice
Marshall recognized that the rights involved were not mere "business"
interests and urged a closer scrutiny of the state's justifications. Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
94. Id. at 485, 486-87 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 485.
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A. THE UNSUITABLE FORMULATION OF THE
"RIGHT To LIFE" DocTRINE
The suggestion here is that successful constitutional change
requires more than the vehicle of an acceptable constitutional
theory and the existence of a tenable new doctrine. Constitu-
tional change requires also that the Court have a reason for in-
tervention; thus, the proper tools as well as the desire to frame a
new constitutional precedent are essential to that end.
1. Doctrinal Language
Ideally a doctrine as a "tool" of constitutional change should
proceed logically from some articulated constitutional language
and should be stated in manageable terms which permit judicial
expansion or contraction. Far from the ideal, the "right to life"
doctrine proceeded from the vaguest of constitutional language,
and its broad, global terms did not easily permit judicial contrac-
tion. The doctrine's language tended toward the grandiose and
suggested social principles far beyond the specific economic and
welfare issues involved in Dandridge. Almost anything touching
upon "existence" wandered into the domain of the "right to life."
Thus the issue of the prohibition of all abortions might have
been equally as appropriate to the "right to life" rubric as was
the far different issue of welfare benefits.
2. Doctrinal Consequences
However, even the doctrinal language was not the fatal flaw
in the OEO lawyers' presentation. The consequences of the adop-
tion of a successful doctrine are justified in terms of basic and
well supported social values. To paraphrase H.L.A. Hart,90 when
a doctrine has been accepted the judge has been urged to
translate societal rules into legal rules. While some strongly
felt social values were founded in the "right to life," the effort
to judicialize these values came at a time when popular and
political support for welfare was manifestly on the wane. Judi-
cial action is invoked as being in consonance with long range
principles that are temporarily forgotten by a fleeting major-
ity, or as being an unfolding of a rule that is based on esoteric
wisdom, or as being a product of a new consciousness of the social
situation. Judicial action is not, however, effectively invoked to
shore up an ebbing social tide. The OEO lawyers' attempt to
96. H.L.A. HART, THE CoNcEPT OF LAw (1961).
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gain judicial acceptance of a doctrine for which the popular
support was fading was really just another abortive attempt to
retire "into the judiciary as a stronghold." 97
The Court generally sees that the problems ensuing from the
acceptance of a new doctrine either have existing remedies or at
least appear to be manageable. This rule of thumb, that a deci-
sion should not open a flood of new cases, has been overlooked
in extreme cases, but only with grave judicial misgivings. In
contrast, the acceptance of the "right to life" doctrine at best
would have created a vague, general imperative the specific
mechanics of which would have to be formulated by the legisla-
tures. At worst, its acceptance would have created a generation
of litigation in which courts would be called upon to assess parti-
cularized .dollar allocations for welfare allowances. Thus, the
problems emanating from the acceptance of the "right to life"
doctrine were clear and stunning, the solutions vague and prob-
lematic.
Although the theory of substantive equal protection was an
adequate vehicle for constitutional change, the doctrine of the
"right to life" was not suited to rapid judicial acceptance. There
were sympathetic ears on the Court who might have responded
to a careful pace. A cautious approach over time might have
provided the third prerequisite to constitutional change, the
reasons and mood for judicial intervention.98
97. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, Dec. 19, 1801,
in THE WarriGs oF THo As JEFFmsoN 301-02 (1904).
98. The notion of "special scrutiny" by the Court can be traced
most directly to Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938):
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth....
The Carolene decision sustained a federal statute excluding "filled
milk" from interstate commerce, but Stone's footnote had suggested a
stricter standard of review where the legislation in question threatened
the openness of the political process. Stone suggested two additionaljustifications for special scrutiny of legislative decisions: (1) where
parochial interests had great influence with the determining govern-
mental body the courts could bring to bear a national interest otherwise
under-represented; (2) where discrete and insular minorities were ex-
cluded from political effectiveness the courts could intervene to restore
a democratic balance.
Stone's further justification of judicial intervention on behalf of fed-
eralism was used with great effectiveness by welfare lawyers to elimi-
nate waiting periods and other "procedural" measures which insulated a
particular state from the national welfare problems. The welfare law-
yers were effective in this area because they had pre-existing and ac-
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B. THE MODEL OF A SUCCESSFUL DocTNE: ABSOLUTISM
In contrast to the failure of the "right to life" effort is the
history of the first amendment and the success of Meiklejohn's
absolutism. 99 The doctrine of absolutism was as strange and ex-
treme at its first unveiling as the equal protection enshrinement
of the welfare state was in the late 1960's. As late as 1951,
Justice Vinson said: "Nothing is more certain in modern society
than the principle that there are no absolutes."'10 0 Yet as time
passed, absolutism has become a barely submerged doctrine of
great impact, implicit in a series of still vital decisions.' 0 ' An
impetus to the development of due process theory came from
the absolutist writings of Meiklejohn, and his doctrine made its
way into actual decision. An impetus to the development of
equal protection theory came from the writings of ten Broek
and Tussman; yet the "right to life" doctrine was rejected in
actual decision. An explanation of the difference between
these doctrinal dispositions should emerge in positive terms from
a delineation of the success of absolutism.
1. Doctrinal Language and Consequences
In contrast to the "right to life," absolutism was bottomed
in the most literal of constitutional readings. As the late Jus-
tice Black remarked, "I understand that it is rather old-fashioned
and shows a slight naivete to say that 'no law' means 'no law'."'' 0 2
Moreover, the doctrine promised to solve rather than to create
some very specific problems. At the time it appeared that the
adoption of the doctrine would remove from the judicial arena
the troublesome and time consuming issue of obscenity. The
adoption of the doctrine also promised to open up the political
process by providing sure guidelines for public criticism of poli-
tical leadership, and in this respect, unlike the "right to life,"
cepted reasons for judicial intervention. The lawyers failed in the over-
all attempt to establish the right to life within the fourteenth amendment
because they could not offer such reasons nor quickly create a mood for
judicial intervention.
99. WMeiklejohn suggested that the right to political expression was
"absolute" and unregulatable in MKiKLEjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), which was republished in ex-
tended form in MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
100. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
101. This is particularly evident in the progeny of New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
102. Note, Justice Black and First Amendment Absolutes: A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 549, 553 (1962).
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absolutism was already implicit in a wealth of common law
decisions. 0 3
2. Doctrinal Evolution rather than Revolution
In contrast to the gradual evolution of absolutism, the es-
tablishment of the "right to life" was attempted precipitously.
The gradual evolution of absolutism benefited its development
as much as the rapidity of the OEO lawyers' efforts thwarted
the development of the "right to life." The first amendment
absolutists were able to draw upon a great range of legal talents
whose study and criticism of the doctrine honed and refined the
Meiklejohn arguments. The courts themselves had decades in
which both to refine and to accept the doctrine; even seminal
first amendment cases are rarely cited in decisions because so
many cases have intervened.10 4  In contrast the "right to life"
doctrine was pushed onto the scene in public lectures and occa-
sional law review articles, both of which were often products
of OEO grants and thus obvious "packages" that were to be ac-
cepted by the courts. There simply was no time to analyze, let
alone refine, the "right to life" doctrine, and the Court was asked
in Dandridge to adopt a doctrine which was supported by the
barest of precedent.
VII. THE INSTRUMENTS OF CHANGE
Arguably the "right to life" concept represented the single
most dramatic policy change in American society since the aboli-
tion of slavery. Certainly its implications were more far-reach-
ing than those of the various New Deal measures, the Federal
Reserve Act or even the Social Security Act itself. Only the
concepts of collective bargaining and desegregation affected the
lives of as many Americans as would have the "right to life." The
comprehensive consequences of the adoption of a "right to life"
raise questions about the instruments of such change-the OEO
lawyers in the first instance and the courts in the final determin-
ation.
A. THE GovERNMNT LAWYER
There has often been postulated a fundamental contradic-
tion between the welfare lawyers' working within the social
103. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
104. See generally Krislov, The Supreme Court and Political Free-
doa, 1968 N.Y. FRE PRES 175-79.
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order and truly changing that same order.10 Stephen Wexler
has suggested:
Several ... factors . . . serve to shorten the time one can ex-
pect a lawyer to remain in poverty practice. It is usually the
government which pays a poverty lawyer; it is also often the
government that a poverty lawyer will oppose in his client's
interests. Thus, the more effective a poor people's lawyer, the
more problems he poses for those who pay him. Even the
few poverty lawyers who do decide to make a career of poor
people's law face the threat that the decision is not entirely in
their hands; the better they are at their jobs, the more likely it
becomes that the government will eliminate their jobs.100
In an earlier analysis of the OEO legal services program, Geof-
frey Hazard agreed .vith Wexler to the extent that the program
was misconceived because it aimed at change rather than ser-
vice:
The fact remains that in a constitutional regime partisan politi-
cal activity is supposed to be a matter of private initiative.
For such a regime to survive it has to stay pretty much that
way in fact. However inconstantly the principle is fulfilled, it
rests on a recognition that a government which creates agencies
to formulate what shall be taken as the people's will is no
longer a government by the people. The force of the point is
suggested by asking what would be the consequences of gener-
alizing the proposition that the poor should have lobbyists paid
by the government: Should similar lobbyists be provided the
near-poor, the middle-class, the affluent? How does one ra-
tionally allocate the political resources through which resource
allocation is made? One comes uneasily to the conclusion that
the idea simply does not have sustaining attraction.
The conclusion also suggests itself that the idea of "lobby-
ists for the poor" is both precious and irrelevant.10 7
Hazard criticised the notion that the OEO lawyers could define
a mission themselves and then pursue that mission to its ulti-
mate, "letting justice be done though the heavens fall." The
fight to help the poor should spring from private initiative, and
105. A longtime court observer for the New York Times wrote:
The real trouble is that Legal Aid lawyers are still lawyers,
and as such they believe in the very system they must attack to
be loyal to their clients. To attack it properly they should not
hesitate to destroy it. But they cannot even consciously think
of it in this manner. If they did, they might do something
terrible. They might become unpopular.
Zion, On the Limits of Litigation, 30 ANTxocH RKv. 185, 193-94 (1970).
For some variants of this position see, e.g., RADICAL LAwYERs (J. Black
ed. 1971).
106. Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051
(1970). Cf. Holmes, The Poverty Lawyers' Work Is So Good It Has to
be Stopped, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June, 1970, at 50-58.
107. Hazard, Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. CHr.
L. REv. 242, 254-55 (1970).
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the government should react to the public rather than formu-
late that same public will
Interestingly, the original advocates of the "lobbyists for
the poor" are now among the most disillusioned and advocate
abandonment of any ameliorative role for lawyers. The indi-
vidual probably most identified with the reformist-through-law
strategy, Edward Sparer, now dismisses the legal services pro-
gram:
The welfare recipients lawyer started his struggle in 1965 not
merely as a technician whose function was to help the welfare
system conform to what the elected representatives of the ma-
jority had decreed it should be. His mission was to utilize the
legal process to help change the very nature of the welfare sys-
tem and, thereby, to change the ground rules of American so-
ciety. No mere legal technician, he was a grand strategist. No
mere advocate of other people's yearnings, he yearned for the
change with his clients. And for a brief moment in the 1960's
when it appeared that a majority, or at least their elected rep-
resentatives, were ready to accept some basic change, his mis-
sion appeared possible. In 1970, it does not. No more a sig-
nificant participant in grand change, he appears reduced to
what the revolutionist has often accused the lawyer of being-
a technical aide who smooths the functioning of an inadequate
system and thereby helps perpetuate it.10
In an examination of the failure of the OEO lawyers' con-
stitutional aspirations, an emphasis upon their inability to work
"within the system" seems more theoretical than practical and is
misplaced. The real explanations of the failure have been out-
lined in this Article-the conflict and ambiguity in the legal ser-
vices theory, the confusion of the OEO legal strategy, the lack
of suitability of the "right to life" doctrine and, ultimately,
the destructive speed of the constitutional attack. If agoniz-
ing over the proper role of the government lawyer offers any in-
sight into the failure, it is that insight which was implied in the
statement by Sparer. Sparer was active in the fight to constitu-
tionalize the right to welfare, and therefore his disappointment
in the Dandridge outcome is understandable. His resultant dis-
missal of the fight, however, is not. Rather, it is indicative of
the very impatience which caused the failure in the end.
B. Tns LMAITs OF TBE JUDIciAL Paocss
In general, attempts to differentiate the judicial from the leg-
islative process on a broad conceptual level have not shown up
108. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AmucANs 84
(N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
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well in the light of what actually occurs. 1 9 It is difficult in our
American system to find a type of action which is ineluctably
legislative, an action a court would never take. Even "legisla-
tive" matters such as war and peace," 0 who may be seated in
Congress"' and who may receive government funds' 2 have
been found cognizable in court. The concept of a "political
question," the judicial effort to give operant meaning to what is
the proper role of the judiciary, seems today more elusive and
imprecise and less a convincing product of judicial conviction
than ever before.
Judge Friendly has pointed out that courts are both reluc-
tant and unconvincing when they are put to a "legislative" choice
from among several plausible decisions, for example, that be-
tween five and one-half percent and six percent as a proper in-
terest rate and that between the first and second trimester as
the basis for abortion policy." 3 Although judges have made de-
cisions on such matters, they have done so with the awareness
that they are at the fringes of their judicial authority. The courts
are especially reticent to "legislate" when the disposition of pub-
lic funds is involved; the political and social reality is that peo-
ple are more willing to pay taxes if they consider themselves
able to determine by vote who will spend the revenue and how
it will be spent. Thus, it is the lack of an identifiable constituency
that most closely differentiates the courts from the other branch-
es of government. The court's very amateur standing as a topi-
cal generalist permits little continuity in supportive groups
and limits its effective ability and willingness to take on major
social changes.
The OEO lawyers were sensitive to this judicial reluctance
and thus stressed the moderate and sometimes fiscally trivial
consequences of a favorable decision rather than the moral ad-
109. See, e.g., Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L.
REV. 41 (1937), for an iconoclastic view of similarities in the processes.
It has been argued that judicialization and legislation were once com-
mingled and that the more specialized processes of individual adjudica-
tion and broad policy-framing emerged indistinctly from their original
union. Conversely it has been argued that policy-making is disjunc-
tive from policy application, i.e., that courts were more aptly compared
with the executive than with the legislature. Compare C. MCILWAIN,
THE -hGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY (1910) with F.
GoODNOW, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION (1900).
110. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex Parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1875).
111. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
112. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
113. H. FamNDLY, BENCHmARKS 11-13 (1967).
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vance represented by the decision's symbolic values."14  How-
ever, in Dandridge the subjective choices facing the Court were
less "judicial" and the practical consequences of a favorable
decision were less easily demonstrable than in many earlier wel-
fare cases. The Maryland welfare authorities did present to
the Court specific figures demonstrating the immediate shortage
of funds which would result if constant amounts were extended
to those who were otherwise excluded by the family maximum.1"
Assuming a fixed overall state grant, these figures put the Court
in the position of making a "legislative" choice between a lower
amount for every individual and the higher per person amount
assured in limiting the number of recipients by a family maxi-
mum. The state also argued on economic and political grounds
that there was a need for a maximum set at less than the amount
earned by workers at a reasonable level of skill so as not to dis-
courage the labor market by the grant payments." 6 However,
the economic effect of welfare payments upon the labor supply
was not amenable to empirical investigation nor was it easily
demonstrable, and the judgment as to the political backing for
a welfare program was preeminently one for the legislature to
make.1 17 The Court concluded:
We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise,
that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives
that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more just and
humane system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of
morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and propo-
nents of almost every measure, certainly including the one
before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philo-
sophical problems presented by public welfare assistance pro-
grams are not the business of this Court. The Constitution
may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of wel-
fare administration .... But the Constitution does not em-
power this Court to second-guess state officials charged with
114. E.g., Reynolds v. Smith, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), a durational re-
quirement case in which the Pennsylvania department of the OEO pre-
sented precise cost estimates to demonstrate the minimal effects of a
favorable decision.
115. Appendix to Brief for Plaintiffs at 77-78, Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
116. Id. at 115.
117. An indication of the evidentiary problem facing the OEO
lawyers appears in the Brief for Appellants at 26, Washington v. Harrell,
394 U.S. 618 (1969), a residence requirement case in which the state
argued:
In these days of sociological sophistication it is surely
somewhat presumptuous of plaintiffs to ask the Court to rely
entirely on their mere speculations as to the actual effect of
residence requirements on patterns of migration. If no com-
plete study was at hand plaintiffs surely should have buttressed
their contention with at least a limited study of their own.
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the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare
funds among the myriad of potential recipients.118
In Dandridge more than in earlier welfare cases, the OEO
lawyers seemed to face issues which arguably fell outside judi-
cial competence, if not authority. What seems on first impres-
sion to be clearly in the domain of the legislature, however, may
become by familiarity or the passage of time assimilated to the
judiciary. Such assimilation is defensible either in the ques-
tionable argument that the legislature has acquiesced or on the
equally problematic grounds that societal acceptance of the
norms involved makes judicial action an appropriate process.
In any event, time can provide both the clear theorization which
facilitates and sustains judicial policy-making and the "com-
pelling" plaintiff who presents a precise legal claim requiring
judicial action.
In a sense then, it was the speed of the OEO effort which
led to its failure. Decisive strategy and rapid-fire attack are
generally incompatible with, and at the very least create prob-
lems for, the normal judicial process. The development of "arbi-
trary" solutions from among the set of plausible rules which in-
here in every situation is obscured and mollified by the flow of
time and the succession of change it brings. In this sense the
legislative process is a recapitulation of the judicial, or the judi-
cial a slow-motion projection of the legislative. Major social
change which is for temporary or permanent reasons unobtain-
able from the "popular" branches of government may be en-
dowed with a greater legitimacy when made by the courts if
the shift from majoritarian to normative judgment is spread
out over time. The clash between the two modes of decision
making and discourse is less evident when the intervention of
events allows the evidence to go unnoticed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the attempt to constitutionalize a right to welfare by
gaining Supreme Court acceptance of a "right to life" as a "fun-
damental" right guaranteed by the equal protection clause, the
OEO lawyers both were faced with and created many problems
which they could not surmount. Initially, the legal services pro-
gram of the OEO was founded on theory so vague that it frus-
trated the formulation of goals and the selection of directions.
Once it was in operation, the effectiveness of the program was
118. 397 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added).
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consistently dampened by the strategical tension between the
advocates of the legal aid-client need approach and those of the
test case-institational attack approach. Moreover, Smith's "right
to life" doctrine itself was an over broad conception which was
ill-suited to rapid acceptance by the Court.
In the end, however, it was not these problems which caused
the ultimate failure of the OEO effort; but rather, it was the
problem of time. There was not enough time for the necessary
analysis, criticism and refinement of the "right to life" doctrine.
There was not enough time to permit a judicial acceptance of a
new constitutional doctrine nor was there time to obscure the
fine line between judicial and legislative rulemaking authority.
The OEO lawyers overenthusiastically used rather than totally
misused that process. Their espousal of a strategy, their tac-
tics and their sense of what was achievable in a short period of
time all appear faulty. A more cautious approach, a more limited
set of expectations and above all a patience might achieve much
of what was originally aspired. There is no reason to believe that
the ultimate goal cannot be achieved with realistic aims and ex-
pectations.
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